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Whether or not to change strategy depends not only on the personal success of each individual, but also on
the success of others. Using this as motivation, we study the evolution of cooperation in games that describe
social dilemmas, where the propensity to adopt a different strategy depends both on individual fitness as well as
on the strategies of neighbors. Regardless of whether the evolutionary process is governed by pairwise or group
interactions, we show that plugging into the “wisdom of groups” strongly promotes cooperative behavior. The
more the wider knowledge is taken into account the more the evolution of defectors is impaired. We explain
this by revealing a dynamically decelerated invasion process, by means of which interfaces separating different
domains remain smooth and defectors therefore become unable to efficiently invade cooperators. This in turn
invigorates spatial reciprocity and establishes decentralized decision making as very beneficial for resolving
social dilemmas.
The evolutionary success of the human species is to a large
extent due to our exceptional other-regarding abilities [1]. Co-
operation in the genus Homo is believed to have evolved to
help us cope with rearing offspring that survived [2], as well
as to help us mitigate between-group conflicts [3]. Today it is
instrumental for harvesting the benefits of collective efforts on
an unprecedented scale, which in turn fuels the progress and
innovation we are able to witness on a daily basis. However,
it may well be that these behavioral predispositions also make
us very susceptible to what others are doing, as well as say-
ing and even thinking about us [4]. Everyone fancies being
unique, yet the reality is such that much of our individuality
is lost to conformance in both appearance and behavior. On
the other hand, tuning in to the masses also has notable advan-
tages, most prominently creating the opportunity to exploit the
so-called “wisdom of the crowd” effect [5]. Indeed, the first
evidence suggesting that the average of many estimates may
be closer to the truth as individual, albeit expert opinions is
more than a century old [6]. In this paper, we investigate the
merit of this fascinating phenomenon for the successful evo-
lution of cooperation in games that describe social dilemma
situations [7–9].
Evolutionary games can be classified to those that are gov-
erned by pairwise interactions and to those that are governed
by group interactions. The prisoner’s dilemma game [10] is a
classical example of an evolutionary game that is governed by
pairwise interactions. The public goods game, on the other
hand, is a typical example of an evolutionary game that is
governed by group interactions. As highlighted by recent re-
search [11–24], the distinction may be crucial as group in-
teractions provide an inherently different environment, one
where the trails of those that defect are blurred and where
therefore proper reciprocity is a challenge. Regardless of the
distinction, when individual prosperity calls for actions that
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harm the wellbeing on the collective level, the population is
faced with a social dilemma that may results in a “tragedy of
the commons” [25]. While several mechanisms that prevent
defection from taking over have already been discovered [26],
the identification of conditions for the survival and spreading
of cooperation among selfish individuals still remains a grand
challenge, both by games governed by pairwise as well as by
games governed by group interactions.
Recent reviews are a testament to the vibrancy of this field
of research [27–30], linking together knowledge from biology,
sociology, economics as well as mathematics and physics,
to provide a better understanding of why we so frequently
choose cooperation over defection. Particularly relevant for
the present work are preceding papers considering different
learning abilities of players [31–36], where however the latter
were assumed by default and altered by explicit rules rather
than being something that emerges and varies spontaneously
in dependence on the behavior of the neighbors. Most impor-
tantly, here we assume that the propensity of each individual
to adopt a new strategy depends on the behavior within the
group of immediate neighbors. If the strategy of the player
is the same as that of the majority of other players its learn-
ing activity will be low. Conversely, if the strategy is different
than that of the majority, the learning activity of the player
will be high. True to a physicist approach, a single parame-
ter α interpolates between completely ignoring the “wisdom
of the group” and considering it ardently. Note that the as-
sumption is that the strategy of each individual is representa-
tive for its knowledge, and that thus the collective information
on the strategies within the group is equally representative for
the group wisdom. Thereby we thus wed the “wisdom of the
crowd” effect [5] with evolutionary games, albeit referring to
groups rather than crowds to adjust the terminology accord-
ingly.
As we will show in what follows, the stronger the feedback
between the group and the individual player, i.e., the larger the
value of α (see Fig. 7 and the Methods section), the more suc-
cessful the evolution of cooperation. This holds true for both
the prisoner’s dilemma and the public goods game, thus point-
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FIG. 1: The “wisdom of groups” promotes the evolution of coopera-
tion in the prisoner’s dilemma game on the square lattice. Depicted
is the fraction of cooperators ρC in dependence on the temptation to
defect b, as obtained for different values of α (see figure legend). It
can be observed that the larger the value of α the higher the value of b
where cooperators are able to dominate and survive the evolutionary
competition with defectors.
ing towards a universal mechanism that bridges the distinction
between games governed by pairwise and games governed by
group interactions. Responsible for this is a dynamically mod-
ified invasion process that is completely strategy independent,
yet by means of which cooperators, unlike the defectors, are
able to draw a significant evolutionary advantage. On the one
hand, it helps cooperators to build sizable compact clusters
with smooth interfaces, and on the other, it prevents defectors
to invade rapidly. The fact that retarding fast invasion has un-
equal consequence for the competing strategies has been em-
phasized before in the context of aging in evolutionary games
[37] and the evolution of public cooperation on interdepen-
dent networks [38], which altogether points to a discovery of a
general and widely applicable phenomenon, during which the
“wisdom of groups” is exploited for the effective resolution
of social dilemmas. More detailed results will be presented
next, while for details concerning the employed evolutionary
games we refer to the Methods section.
Results
We begin by presenting results for the prisoner’s dilemma
game on the square lattice. Figure 1 shows how the stationary
fraction of cooperators ρC varies in dependence on the temp-
tation to defect b for different values ofα. The curve forα = 0
is a well-known result of evolutionary spatial games, accord-
ing to which in the absence of the “wisdom of the group” ef-
fect cooperators on the square lattice die out at the critical
b(K = 0.1) = 1.0358, and the extinction belongs to the di-
rected percolation universality class [39]. As the knowledge
of the group is taken into account, however, the critical temp-
tation to defect shifts towards larger values. In fact, the higher
the value of α, the higher the critical value of b at which co-
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FIG. 2: The “wisdom of groups” promotes the evolution of coopera-
tion irrespective of the properties of the interaction network. In this
figure the prisoner’s dilemma game was staged on the honeycomb
lattice. Depicted is the fraction of cooperators ρC in dependence on
the temptation to defect b, as obtained for different values of α (see
figure legend). As by the results obtained on the square lattice de-
picted in Fig. 1, it can be observed that the larger the value of α the
higher the value of b where cooperators outperform defectors.
operators die out. Also worth highlighting is that for α = 0
cooperators are never able to completely dominate the pop-
ulation. Conversely, for α > 1 there always exist a critical
temptation to defect below which defectors die out. Again,
the higher the value of α, the higher the value of b at which
defectors are still unable to survive. The conclusion that im-
poses itself is thus that the “wisdom of groups” promotes the
evolution of cooperation and thus aids the resolution of so-
cial dilemmas. Not only are the cooperators able to survive at
higher values of b, but also their range of complete dominance
increases with increasing values of α.
Further supporting the generality of our observations are re-
sults obtained on the honeycomb lattice, which are presented
in Fig. 2. The honeycomb lattice has the lowest degree pos-
sible for spatial graphs (z = 3), which should minimize the
effects of spatial reciprocity. Despite of this, taking into ac-
count the “wisdom of groups” has virtually an identical im-
pact on the evolution of cooperation as it does on the square
lattice. It is also well known that cooperation is markedly
affected by the type of the interaction network [27], where
in particular the scale-free degree distribution has been iden-
tified as a potent promoter of cooperative behavior [40–53].
Furthermore, more subtle properties of interaction networks,
such as the clustering coefficient and the average degree of
players have also been emphasized as being crucial [54]. We
therefore simulated the evolutionary process also on the tri-
angular lattice, which has a high clustering coefficient, and
we observed a qualitatively similar impact of the “wisdom of
groups” effect. Thereby we thus establish that the reported
promotion of cooperation is to a large degree independent of
the particularities of the interaction network.
Besides different interaction networks, the distinction be-
tween games governed by pairwise interactions and games
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FIG. 3: The “wisdom of groups” promotes the evolution of cooper-
ation irrespective of the type of the game. In this figure the public
goods game was staged on the square lattice. Depicted is the frac-
tion of cooperators ρC in dependence on the multiplication factor r,
as obtained for different values of α (see figure legend). As by the
results obtained for the prisoner’s dilemma game in Figs. 1 and 2, it
can be observed that the larger the value of α the lower the multipli-
cation factor r that is needed for cooperators to survive and dominate
the population.
governed by group interactions may also play a crucial role, as
emphasized in the Introduction. While the prisoner’s dilemma
is the paradigmatic example of a pairwise driven game, the
same is true for the public goods game as the game that is
governed by group interactions. With this in mind, we present
in Fig. 3 the stationary fraction of cooperators in dependence
on the multiplication factor r for different values of α. Note
that unlike for the value of b in the prisoner’s dilemma game,
here the lower the value of r the more challenging the evo-
lution of cooperation. For α = 0 the outcome is again a
well-known result, according to which cooperators die out at
the critical r/G = 0.748 and start dominating the population
completely at r/G = 1.1 [11]. However, for larger values of
α the “wisdom of groups” is introduced to the players, and ac-
cordingly the critical values of r shift. It can be observed that
the higher the value of α, the lower the critical multiplication
factors at which cooperators are able to survive and dominate
the evolutionary competition with defectors. It is also worth
pointing out that the interval of r values supporting the coex-
istence of both strategies shrinks continuously as α increases.
Altogether, these results convincingly support the fact that the
“wisdom of groups” effect supports the evolution of coopera-
tion not only in games governed by pairwise interactions, but
also in games that are governed by group interactions.
Given the general applicability of the reported cooperation-
promoting mechanism, it is of significant interest to elucidate
why then taking into account the wider knowledge of groups
upon deciding whether or not to change a strategy is so ben-
eficial for the effective resolution of social dilemmas. Hence-
forth we focus on the prisoner’s dilemma game on the square
lattice, although we note that qualitatively identical results can
also be obtained on other lattices or with the public goods
game.
First, we present in Fig. 4 characteristic spatial patterns that
emerge if the evolutionary process is initiated from a prepared
initial state. The goal is to start with rough interfaces, as the
evolution along them has often been identified as crucial for
deciding the winner between cooperators and defectors in spa-
tial games. For α = 0 (top row), in the absence of the “wis-
dom of groups” where the learning activity of all players is
the same (see Fig. 7), defectors can easily invade cooperators,
and their invasions make the interface increasingly irregular
[panel (b)]. This in turn further weakens spatial reciprocity
and finally results in a pure D phase (not shown). For α = 4
(bottom row), when the “wisdom of groups” is turned on and
accordingly the learning activity of players is strongly driven
by the strategies of their neighbors, the evolution is signifi-
cantly different. Here instead of additional roughening due to
invading defectors, the interface is actually smoothed as the
“peaks” of defectors are rapidly suppressed [panels (g) and
(h)]. The result of this process are smooth straight interfaces
that bolster the effectiveness of spatial reciprocity, and hence
enable the survival of cooperators even at large temptations
to defect, as demonstrated in Fig. 1. We note that in the bot-
tom row of Fig. 4 cooperators eventually come to dominate
the population completely (not shown). Interestingly, the pro-
motion of cooperation due to the smoothing of interfaces has
recently been reported also in the context of the spatial pub-
lic goods game with adaptive punishment [55]. Here, how-
ever, the reason lies not in punishing defectors, but rather in
a dynamically modified invasion process, as we will further
explain in what follows.
Equipped with the insight from the evolution of spatial pat-
terns from a prepared initial state as presented in Fig. 4, it is
next of interest to investigate the evolution of spatial patterns
under the effect of the “wisdom of groups” from a random ini-
tial state. Figure 5 features a series of snapshots that are char-
acteristic for an evolutionary process that is subject to spatial
reciprocity. Cooperators are first rather quickly brought to the
brink of extinction [panel (b)], only to recuperate rather spec-
tacularly after properly regrouping and forming sufficiently
large compact clusters [panels (c) and (d)]. The final state is
a pure C phase, which is not shown. It is important to note
that the “wisdom of groups” invigorates spatial reciprocity,
yet it also requires a more delicate formation of cooperative
clusters to begin with. We emphasize that the majority of
small circular C domains in panel (b) vanishes. Only those
with “straight” borders and of sufficient size form the nucleus
from which the reinvasion of cooperators can begin, as de-
picted in panels (c) and (d). The deciding battle between the
two competing strategies thus takes place along the interfaces
where there are “steps” in the straight fronts. Here, players
of both strategies are “vulnerable” and susceptible to strategy
change because they have relatively high learning activities
(these players are marked with brighter red and blue colors),
while away from such steps the evolutionary process is sig-
nificantly decelerated. Although this effect affects as much
defectors as it does cooperators, the later are able to draw an
evolutionary advantage. The promotion of cooperation thus
relies on the spontaneous emergence of a dynamically decel-
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FIG. 4: Interfaces that separate domains of cooperators and defectors remain smooth if the “wisdom of groups” is taken into account. Depicted
is the evolution of a prepared initially rough interface, as obtained for α = 0 [top panels from (a) to (e)], i.e., ignoring the “wisdom of groups”,
and for α = 4 [bottom panels from (f) to (j)]. It can be observed that by taking into account the wider knowledge of the group (bottom row),
the roughening of the interfaces is prevented. Cooperators therefore rise to dominance (the final pure C phase is not shown). In the upper
row the defectors are able to invade the cooperative domains aggressively, which in turn further roughens the interfaces and eventually leads
to a pure D phase (not shown). Note that to distinguish different learning activities w of players, we have used different shades of blue (for
cooperators) and red (for defectors), as indicated in the figure legend. Lighter colors correspond to higher learning activity while darker colors
denote players with lower learning activity. For α = 0 all players constantly have w = 1, and are accordingly depicted by the brightest shades
of blue and red. The snapshots were taken at MCS=0, 10, 30, 70 and 100 for the top row, and at MCS=0, 200, 1400, 6000 and 19000 for the
bottom row. In both cases the temptation to defect was set equal to b = 1.07 and the system size was L = 80 (small solely to ensure a proper
resolution of the relevant spatial patterns).
erated invasion process in the vicinity of straight interfaces.
This is reminiscent of the effect of aging [37] as well as in-
terdependent networks [38], although here it emerges sponta-
neously due to the “wisdom of groups” effect.
The foundations of this effect can be demonstrated nicely
at the microscopic level, where the leading invasion processes
that are responsible for the evolution along the interfaces can
be studied. Top two panels in Fig. 6 show these elementary
steps. Due to the introduced neighbor-dependent learning ac-
tivity, one of the D → C invasions, marked with the gray
arrow, becomes negligible at high α values, in turn leading to
a slight bias in the evolutionary process that supports coopera-
tion. This can actually be quantified by calculating the differ-
ence of invasion probabilities between C → D and D → C
transitions for different values of α. The bottom panel of
Fig. 6 features the results, as obtained for α = 0 and α = 4.
Since the average invasion probability is lowered for higher
values of α, the difference needs to be normalized by an ap-
propriate factor. More precisely, the plotted quantity Φ that
demonstrates the impact of “wisdom of groups” is
Φ =
W (2, 2b− 2) +W (2, 2b− 3)−W (2, 2− 2b)−W (1, 3− 2b)
W (2, 2b− 2) +W (2, 2b− 3) +W (2, 2− 2b) +W (1, 3− 2b)
(1)
where
W (n, dP ) =
(n
z
)α 1
1 + exp[(dP )/K]
(2)
As the lower panel of Fig. 6 shows, the critical b value where
the invasion front changes sign is overestimated (see Fig. 1)
because other processes are neglected by this analysis, yet the
fact that this happens at a higher value of b for larger values
of α clearly explains the reported promotion of cooperation
due to the “wisdom of groups”. As is well-known, it is ben-
eficial for cooperators to be accumulated while the same is
not true for defectors. The revealed dynamics further supports
this cause by means of dynamically modified invasion, which
is significantly decelerated in the absence of steps along the
invasion fronts.
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FIG. 5: Evolution of cooperation from a random initial state under
the influence of the “wisdom of groups”. Depicted are characteristic
spatial patterns, as obtained for α = 4 and b = 1.08. The color
code is the same as used in Fig. 4. Defectors with the highest learn-
ing activity, depicted light red, can be observed at the interfaces that
separate ordered domains. Cooperators are able to overtake these
defectors, which results in smoother interfaces and ultimately in a
pure C phase (not shown). Also note that only the cooperative do-
mains with “straight” borders and of sufficiently large size are able
to prevail against the invading defectors. Smaller circularly shaped
cooperative domains are unable to grow and surrender to the evolu-
tionary pressure rather fast. The snapshots were taken at MCS=0 (a),
10000 (b), 30000 (c) and 41000 (d). The system size was L = 80.
Discussion
Summarizing the results, we have shown that by allowing
individuals to exploit the “wisdom of groups” helps to resolve
social dilemmas, regardless of whether they are described by
games governed by pairwise interactions or by games gov-
erned by group interactions. The main assumption has been
that the strategy of each individual player is representative for
its knowledge, and that accordingly the aggregate informa-
tion about this for each particular group is representative for
the “wisdom of the group”. The later has been taken into ac-
count by modifying the learning activity of players. If the
strategy of a player has been the same as the strategy of the
majority of other players within the group, then its propensity
to change it, and accordingly its learning activity, would be
low. Conversely, if the strategy has been different, the player
would be eager to change it, and accordingly it would had a
high learning activity. Although the dynamical alteration of
learning activities is obviously strategy independent, we have
shown that it creates significant evolutionary advantages for
the cooperators. Foremost, it slows down the evolutionary
process once strategies begin to aggregate. Cooperators are
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FIG. 6: Schematic presentation of the leading invasion process and
the corresponding difference of invasion probabilities with and with-
out taking into account the “wisdom of groups”. Arrows in the top
two panels depict the leading invasion process for α = 0 (left) and
α = 4 (right). The invasion that is marked by the gray arrow in
the right panel becomes practically irrelevant due to large α (see
main text for details). The color code is the same as used in Figs. 4
and 5 to distinguish players with different learning activities. Lower
panel depicts the normalized difference of invasion probabilities Φ of
C → D and D → C strategy changes in dependence on the temp-
tation to defect b at K = 0.5. It can be observed that for α = 4 the
invasion front changes sign at a higher value of b than for α = 0,
thus corroborating the reported promotion of cooperation due to the
“wisdom of groups” at the microscopic level of the evolutionary pro-
cess.
therefore able to build compact clusters with smooth inter-
faces, while defectors are unable to invade efficiently. On the
one hand, the “wisdom of groups” thus reinforces the work-
ings of spatial reciprocity [56], and on the other it prevents
defectors to utilize their superior fitness in pairwise compar-
isons with their neighbors. We have demonstrated this mech-
anism also at the microscopic level, by comparing the lead-
ing invasion process, which is responsible for the evolution
along the interfaces, with and without invoking the “wisdom
of groups”. We have concluded that the mechanism of coop-
eration promotion relies on the spontaneous emergence of a
dynamically decelerated invasion process, which is conceptu-
ally similar as reported previously in the context of aging in
evolutionary games [37] and the evolution of public coopera-
tion on interdependent networks [38], yet with the crucial dif-
ference that here it emerges spontaneously using a completely
different motivational and methodological background.
The study of the “wisdom of crowds”, although formally in-
troduced in the past decade [5], has roots that go back a whole
century [6, 57]. Although it is accepted that it works in fa-
6vor of our societies and social welfare [58], it is still critically
probed, questioned and elaborated upon even today [59–61].
As we hope this study succeeded to demonstrate, evolutionary
games provide a theoretical framework that is very much sus-
ceptible to this phenomenon, and we hope to have elicit the
interest of readers to continue along this line of research.
Methods
We consider two different evolutionary games, namely the
prisoner’s dilemma and the public goods game, on different
lattices of size L2 and degree z with periodic boundary con-
ditions.
The prisoner’s dilemma is characteristic for games that are
governed by pairwise interactions. It entails cooperators and
defectors as the two competing strategies, and it is character-
ized by the temptation to defect T = b, reward for mutual
cooperation R = 1, and both the punishment for mutual de-
fection P as well as the suckers payoff S equaling 0. As is
standard practice, 1 < b ≤ 2 ensures a proper payoff rank-
ing and captures the essential social dilemma between indi-
vidual and common interests [56]. Player x with strategy sx
acquires its payoff pisx by playing the game pairwise with all
its z neighbors.
The public goods game, on the other hand, is characteristic
for games that are governed by group interactions. Accord-
ingly, players are arranged into overlapping groups of size G,
such that every player is connected to its z = G − 1 near-
est neighbors and is a member of g = G different groups.
Here players must decide simultaneously whether they wish
to contribute to the common pool or not. All the contribu-
tions are then multiplied by a factor r > 1 to take into account
synergetic effects of cooperation, and the resulting amount is
divided equally among all G group members irrespective of
their initial decision. From the perspective of each individual,
defection is clearly the rational decision to make, as it yields
the highest personal income if compared to other members of
the group. Player x acquires its payoff piksx by playing the
public goods games as a member of the group k = 1 . . .G,
whereby its overall payoff is thus pisx =
∑
k pi
k
sx
.
Regardless of the interaction network and the type of the
game, initially each individual on site x is designated either
as a cooperator sx = C or defector sx = D with equal proba-
bility. The evolutionary process proceeds via the Monte Carlo
simulation procedure, comprising the following elementary
steps. First, a randomly selected player x acquires its pay-
off pisx . Next, player x chooses one of its nearest neighbors at
random, and the chosen player y also acquires its payoff pisy
in the same way as previously player x. Finally, player x can
adopt the strategy sy from player y with the probability
W (sx ← sy) = wx
1
1 + exp[(pisx − pisy )/K]
(3)
where K quantifies the uncertainty by strategy adoptions [27]
(without loss of generality we use K = 0.1 for the prisoner’s
dilemma and K = 0.5 for the public goods game throughout
this paper), and wx is the learning activity of player x. Each
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FIG. 7: The “wisdom of groups” dynamically modifies the learning
activity of players. Depicted is the learning activity w in dependence
on the fraction of neighboring players that have a different strategy
than the focal player, as obtained for different values of α (see figure
legend). Traditional versions of both the prisoner’s dilemma and the
public goods game are recovered if α = 0, as then the “wisdom of
groups” is ignored and does not influence the learning activity w.
On the other hand, for larger values of α the impact of the neighbors
becomes increasingly stronger, virtually prohibiting strategy changes
that would introduce a strategy different from their own.
full Monte Carlo step (MCS) gives a chance for every player
to change its strategy once on average.
Importantly, we take the “wisdom of groups” into account
by defining the learning activity as wx = (No/z)α, where
No is the number of neighbors that have a different strategy
than player x and z is the degree of the lattice. Here the pa-
rameter α determines just how seriously the “wisdom of the
group” is considered. The impact of different α values on the
learning activity of players is depicted in Fig. 7. It can be ob-
served that for α = 0 the classical version of the evolutionary
game is recovered, where the learning activity is independent
of the strategies in the neighborhood, and hence the “wisdom
of groups” is completely ignored. For α > 0, however, the
players are increasingly more prone to stick with the strategy
that is representative for their nearest neighbors. In fact, the
larger the value of α, the stronger the feedback between the
group and the individual player.
Presented results were obtained by means of Monte Carlo
simulations on lattices of linear size L = 400 − 1200. The
necessary relaxation times varied between 105 − 107. It is
worth emphasizing that high values of α significantly decel-
erate the evolutionary process, which in turn creates the need
for employing extremely long relaxation times.
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